Richard Rorty’s Philosophy and Social Hopearticulates his philosophical framework, his personal story and philosophical quest, and finally his vision of an educational system worthy of American Democracy.
In the Introduction, Relativism: Finding and Making, Rorty seeks to call the reader out from the history and culture of dualistic thought. By naming that problems that dualism has failed to solve, that of empirically determining what man should do based on what is (found) and what is dependent (made), Rorty offers an alternative view of the universe, one in which man problem-solves by making what he wants. Every man is a philosopher, a politician, a problem-solver, for everyone can employ words to solve transitory problems, generating “consensus on the ends to be achieved and the means to be used to achieve those ends.” (xxv)
Trotsky and the Wild Orchids (chapter One) gives the reader insight into how it is that Rorty became an Anti-dualist, or preferably, a Pragmatist. Rorty’s experiences convinces him that the Dualist problem, that of analytically resolving the relationship between what one believes and what one does, does not exist. This problem is only the historical vocalization of a felt need: the need to justify one’s actions. The quest to justify ones actions by appealing to universal truths, to locate in nature that which tells one how to live, is no longer necessary. According to Rorty, that need was transitory. Dualism was productive in that is empowered man to make his needs known in pre-democratic times. Democracy has eliminated that problem. Rather, each individual is actively perusing interests; each person simply is. Each man and woman is what he or she wants. We need not justify our wants, we need only to vocalize them and let democracy work. Democracy empowers us to solve the conflicts of our opposing desires. And yet Rorty admits that the tension he felt between reality and justice could be resolved – but only in an act of faith, which he did not possess: “I decided that only a religion… could do the trick Plato wanted done.”(12) And earlier: “It seemed clear that Platonism had all the advantages of religion, without requiring the humility Christianity demanded, of which I was apparently incapable.”(9) Is Rorty conceding that Dualism is feasible for some and not for others?
Finally, in chapter seven, Education as Socialization and as Individualization, Rorty lays out his vision for democratic growth. That vision employs elementary and secondary education in the process of fostering in citizens an appreciation for the history and culture of American democracy. Students are to be in awe of the social problems overcome by this system, the best problem-solving system in existence. However, that is not to say there are no problems that have yet to be solved. And it is the task of the higher education professor to expose students to those problems and to motivate them to engage, on a highly individualistic level, in the democratic process in order to create new forms of liberty and freedom. This individualistic process involves the student’s self-recreation, as she comes to the conclusion that culture she is part contains those who have yet to achieve the same degrees of liberty and freedom.
Rorty encourages the reader to hope in the dynamic, organic growth of American democracy, as typified in the higher education experience. And while Rorty is quick to reject the philosopher king of Plato, he casts the college professor in the role of democratic leader. In his Utopian vision of democracy, education plays the most essential part. However, the goal of coming to consensus about what to tell students about the failures of democracy is a task that “cannot be made a matter of explicit institutionalized policy,” for it is “too complicated, controversial and tendentious to be the subject of agreement in a faculty meeting.” (123) The range of experiences of higher education professionals empowers them to live in the chaos that coincides with the organic growth of liberty and freedom.
Rorty on Education
Richard Rorty’s Philosophy and Social Hope articulates his philosophical framework, his personal story and philosophical quest, and finally his vision of an educational system worthy of American Democracy.
In the Introduction, Relativism: Finding and Making, Rorty seeks to call the reader out from the history and culture of dualistic thought. By naming that problems that dualism has failed to solve, that of empirically determining what man should do based on what is (found) and what is dependent (made), Rorty offers an alternative view of the universe, one in which man problem-solves by making what he wants. Every man is a philosopher, a politician, a problem-solver, for everyone can employ words to solve transitory problems, generating “consensus on the ends to be achieved and the means to be used to achieve those ends.” (xxv)
Trotsky and the Wild Orchids (chapter One) gives the reader insight into how it is that Rorty became an Anti-dualist, or preferably, a Pragmatist. Rorty’s experiences convinces him that the Dualist problem, that of analytically resolving the relationship between what one believes and what one does, does not exist. This problem is only the historical vocalization of a felt need: the need to justify one’s actions. The quest to justify ones actions by appealing to universal truths, to locate in nature that which tells one how to live, is no longer necessary. According to Rorty, that need was transitory. Dualism was productive in that is empowered man to make his needs known in pre-democratic times. Democracy has eliminated that problem. Rather, each individual is actively perusing interests; each person simply is. Each man and woman is what he or she wants. We need not justify our wants, we need only to vocalize them and let democracy work. Democracy empowers us to solve the conflicts of our opposing desires. And yet Rorty admits that the tension he felt between reality and justice could be resolved – but only in an act of faith, which he did not possess: “I decided that only a religion… could do the trick Plato wanted done.”(12) And earlier: “It seemed clear that Platonism had all the advantages of religion, without requiring the humility Christianity demanded, of which I was apparently incapable.”(9) Is Rorty conceding that Dualism is feasible for some and not for others?
Finally, in chapter seven, Education as Socialization and as Individualization, Rorty lays out his vision for democratic growth. That vision employs elementary and secondary education in the process of fostering in citizens an appreciation for the history and culture of American democracy. Students are to be in awe of the social problems overcome by this system, the best problem-solving system in existence. However, that is not to say there are no problems that have yet to be solved. And it is the task of the higher education professor to expose students to those problems and to motivate them to engage, on a highly individualistic level, in the democratic process in order to create new forms of liberty and freedom. This individualistic process involves the student’s self-recreation, as she comes to the conclusion that culture she is part contains those who have yet to achieve the same degrees of liberty and freedom.
Rorty encourages the reader to hope in the dynamic, organic growth of American democracy, as typified in the higher education experience. And while Rorty is quick to reject the philosopher king of Plato, he casts the college professor in the role of democratic leader. In his Utopian vision of democracy, education plays the most essential part. However, the goal of coming to consensus about what to tell students about the failures of democracy is a task that “cannot be made a matter of explicit institutionalized policy,” for it is “too complicated, controversial and tendentious to be the subject of agreement in a faculty meeting.” (123) The range of experiences of higher education professionals empowers them to live in the chaos that coincides with the organic growth of liberty and freedom.